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ENGLAND1  
 
 
‘I am always wishing that I knew Scotland. I believe that he who knew 
it would be able to speak some decisive words about English affairs’.  
F. W. Maitland to George Neilson, 9 May 1897.2 
 
 
In a statement of which E. P. Thompson had already approved3, 
Geoffrey Elton once wrote in a book review that ‘the law offers the 
surest way to an understanding of the social history of an age, at 
least before the French Revolution, a surer way than all the non-
applicable refinements of modern sociology or social anthropology’.4 
Elton followed F. W. Maitland, who, in a less acerbic and more 
inclusive way, asserted that ‘legal documents of the most technical 
kind, are the best, often the only evidence that we have for economic 
and social history’.5 In the 1970s and beyond important work was done 
on how criminal law structured class relationships, especially in the 
eighteenth century.6 Against this backdrop, work on civil law and 
property, that dominated analyses of social change in the 1960s – Eric 
Kerridge’s challenge to Tawney and discussion about whether the 
expansion of centralized justice eroded copyholders’ rights or left 
them unchanged7 – has been less fashionable among early-modernists, 
though in-depth and legally informed analysis of economy and society 
through study of the civil and criminal law is bread and butter to 
most medievalists and to specialist legal historians.8  
Only Thompson (and those around him in what some call the 
‘Warwick School’) was able to bridge the divide during the 1970s.9 
Important additions to debates on civil law and society have been made 
since then by a number of early modern scholars, including Sara 
Birtles, Richard Hoyle, Peter King, Tim Stretton and Andy Wood.10 Yet 
Chris Brooks reminds us that an imbalance remains, for ‘it is arguable 
that the civil law is even more important than the criminal law in 
maintaining the social and economic relationships of any society’.11 
The criminal law was allegedly an agency of ideological control, while 
the civil law worked at the heart of economic relationships to exert a 
direct influence on material life. This article seeks to revive and 
re-orientate interest in the interface between law and society by 
looking at what Victorian Henry Maine and his contemporaries termed 
‘historical jurisprudence’, analyzing the history of a society living 
under a system of law.12 Its more modern inspiration is Robert 
Brenner’s proposition that ‘social-property systems, once established, 
tend to set strict limits and impose certain overall patterns upon the 
course of economic evolution’ and social change.13 It treats law as a 
social fact that shapes how people think and behave: what Clifford 
Geertz terms one of the ‘hard surfaces of life … the political, 
economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere 
contained’.14  
Studying custom and its context gives unique insights into 
relations of property, production and law in a society. The first part 
of the article discusses meaning in Scotland, focusing on ‘custom as 
normative practice, custom as unwritten law, and custom in opposition 
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to law’.15 The second seeks to demonstrate (using evidence focusing 
principally on landholding) that custom as legal currency was more 
restricted for Scots than English. The third sets out the implications 
for continuity of landholding and for agrarian change in the Highlands 
of Scotland, an area where custom might be thought strong. The fourth 
deals with the differential legal development of Scotland and England 
between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries and its effects on social 
and tenurial relationships. A final section suggests why custom 
mattered more as a resource to the English, the domains in which it 
was important to Scots and the implications for understanding the 
comparative development of the two societies since the Middle Ages. In 
particular, the article sheds light on the lineages of a problem Eric 
Hobsbawm raised a generation ago and which historians have mulled over 
since: why the peasantry of Scotland was unable to resist more 
effectively the triumph of agrarian capitalism in the eighteenth 
century.16  
 
I 
THE MEANING AND AUTHORITY OF CUSTOM IN SCOTLAND 
Custom is a central feature of historical writing on English 
economy and society in the Middle Ages and beyond, the many meanings 
of the word clearly set out in the literature.17 The first thing that 
an historian of Scotland notices is how little it features in early 
modern legal records or legal texts and how specific those usages 
are.18 There is no entry for ‘custom’ in Morison’s 30,000-page 
Dictionary of Decisions at the Court of Session, Scotland’s supreme 
civil court. There is a heading ‘consuetude’ (Latin consuetudo) where 
the essential meaning is ‘the way things are usually done’ – without 
any necessary appeal to long practice, which was central to the 
English definition of the term.19 The cases cited deal mostly with 
curial practice: the validity of deeds executed by people who were not 
strictly officers or officials, but who were such ‘by habit and 
repute’, or the authority of a court sitting that had been moved from 
its usual location.20 Custom was important in determining where courts 
sat, where they made announcements and how they operated (stylus 
curiae).21 From its early-sixteenth-century inception, the Court of 
Session possessed its own ‘stile practik and consuetude of court’.22 
These examples immediately illustrate both the diverse meanings and 
limited uses of ‘custom’ in Scotland, suggesting that ‘customary 
practice’, in the general sense of the way things are done is a very 
different thing from ‘custom’ as a legal ‘term of art’ with binding 
power in certain circumstances. 
General ‘legal custom’ or ‘“learned custom” was a body of law 
that had developed through judicial decisions and practice’ – what 
Jeremy Bentham called custom in foro - rather than particular popular 
custom provable only to the satisfaction of a locality or a group – 
custom in pais or lex loci, noticed, but not created, by royal 
judges.23 Custom in foro is what the early-seventeenth-century Scottish 
jurist, Sir Thomas Hope, meant when asserting that ‘Roman or civill 
law hes no auctority among ws to derrogat from our customs’.24 His near 
contemporary Sir Thomas Craig too defined ‘the custom of Scotland’ as 
judicial precedent.25 Later in the seventeenth century, James 
Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair, and the writers of legal institutes who 
followed him saw custom as something that had been superseded in the 
Middle Ages by statute law (generally regarded as the pre-eminent 
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source from the sixteenth century at the latest26) and by subsequent 
written court judgements. The Renaissance scholar George Buchanan 
declared in a rhetorical flourish that Scotland had no laws except 
acts of parliament.27 More English-leaning than other ‘institutional’ 
writers, customs for Stair were in fact legal judgements or case law, 
which could declare custom: ‘Yea, and those nations are more happy, 
whose laws have entered by long custom, wrung from debates upon 
particular cases, … abortive in the womb of time’.28 In his late-
eighteenth-century lectures, Baron David Hume followed the earlier 
institutional writers in regarding custom as a contributor to the 
stock of laws and (with equity) a provider of notions of what was 
just, whose continuing relevance in certain narrow (if important) 
areas was due to what he termed ‘natural justice’.29  
Hume’s summary is important for two reasons, the first 
concerning sources of law. Instead of running parallel to it, custom 
provided one historical foundation of Scotland’s common law in that 
long usage could permit actions not otherwise covered by positive law 
as part of a unified ethical system.30 Another contributor was canon 
law, wherein contrary custom could abrogate positive law as the rules 
governing usage were less stringent than at common law. Yet on central 
issues of marriage and legitimacy that affected inheritance and 
landownership the king’s courts of the late Middle Ages gave effect to 
formal canon law not native custom.31 Canonical custom could not 
override Scots statute law after the Reformation, but canon law 
continued to be accepted as a valid point of legal reference.32 Hume 
also reminds us that Scotland had a singular or unitary legal 
tradition with multiple inputs: manifestly after the Reformation, but 
probably even before that with the ius commune and perhaps even before 
the extensive reception of Roman law in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.33 The Court of Session developed supervisory 
jurisdiction over other courts, including those of the church, long 
before the Reformation and was already a vigorous and powerful 
institution with unlimited civil jurisdiction when reconstituted as 
part of the new College of Justice in 1532.34 It was able to make new 
rules and adjust existing laws in the interests of equity. It handled 
both law and equity: while the powers were in theory distinguished, 
there was in practice no specifically equitable jurisdiction and it 
was not until the nineteenth century that serious efforts were made to 
separate them.35  
In England the process was reversed and only in 1875 did the 
Judicature Acts bring about a jurisdictional fusion between law and 
equity. Late medieval and early modern England had a plural legal 
system: common, canon, ecclesiastical, equity and customary law courts 
(among others) each had their own separate niche and fortunes.36 The 
English stressed the antiquity of the common law and identified it 
with custom even more than the Scots, creating what John Pocock calls 
the English ‘common law mind’.37 Yet even in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries English customary law remained a separate 
category with particular local characteristics that were recognised 
and upheld by both common law and equity courts, but never subsumed by 
them. ‘Particular customs’ or community practices were allowed, under 
certain circumstances, to derogate from other English laws.38 For 
example, established local customs could limit the ability of bodies 
like Convocation to amend the ecclesiastical law of England. In his 
early-seventeenth-century Treatise of the nature of lawes, Sir Matthew 
Hale thought that customary law ‘hath not the formality of other 
 4
instituted lawes, yet it hath the substance and equivalence of an 
institution by the legislative authority’.39  
Late medieval and early modern English customary law may have 
been closer to ‘factual equities’ than to substantive law in the 
modern sense of the term, but it was far more legal ‘substance and 
equivalence’ than Scottish treatments.40 Scotland’s royal courts were 
reluctant to allow any local custom to derogate from common law, 
making ‘substance and equivalence’ there very different.41 Custom had 
to be proved to the satisfaction of a court, it had to be reasonable, 
it had to be generally known and well established, and, while it could 
theoretically be an exception to an existing ‘common law’ (a phrase 
which could be understood either as a jus commune or as the king’s law 
that applied to everyone unless he said otherwise42), it had not to be 
inconsistent with any written contract or general body of law.43 
Finally, to be recognized by courts customary practices had to be 
obligatory not discretionary.44 
There was more of a place for custom in Scottish criminal cases 
where punishment was being discussed. Thus a horse thief’s penalty was 
justified in 1712 as being ‘conform to the laws, daily custome and 
practique of Scotland and particularly the highlands and borders 
therof used and observed in such cases’.45 This was again custom in 
foro, but there are also examples of more popular interpretations of 
punishments deployed in quasi-, para- or infra-judicial contexts. 
Across Europe the early modern period was a ‘creative’ one for penal 
practice, which solidified into an exclusive reliance on lex scripta 
during the eighteenth century. An example of creativity and custom 
comes from a local franchise court of the eighteenth century. In 1734 
an abused wife called Ann Johnston and 12 married women from Huntly in 
Aberdeenshire petitioned their regality court to tolerate a riding of 
the stang as a way of shaming her violent husband, John Fraser. They 
said that a riding had already been threatened to frighten Fraser into 
stopping ‘his villanous and cruell usage’ and was ‘use and wont in 
such cases’. In their petition they argued that this punishment, which 
involved carrying the man around backward on a long pole with much 
clamour, ‘has not only ever been practicable in this place but in most 
pairts of this Kingdome, being wee know no Act of Parliament to the 
contrair’.46 Their petition was refused, yet it illustrates Thompson’s 
point about ‘a mode of life in which some part of the law still 
belongs to the community and is theirs to enforce.’47 Scottish law was 
more flexible than English, allowing courts to countenance actions 
that could potentially be deemed criminal, but also to define certain 
acts as crimes even if they had not been formally designated or even 
previously prosecuted as such: anti-combination actions against early 
nineteenth century trades unions are an example.48 Courts could and did 
assume jurisdiction over offences without ‘special authority’ and that 
assumption might be termed ‘customary’.49 Law could be communally 
created and popularly enforced at a local level, but in Scotland this 
applied to criminal not civil matters. 
The final common meaning was a fee or due, most obviously a tax 
levied on trade. Custom as exaction was what Bishop Leslie meant when 
writing in 1578 that ‘the hail nobilitie, yea the scottis ane and al … 
ar frie of al custumes, wt quhilkes ar opprest the subiectes of 
utheris princes’.50 The word was used extensively in the western and 
central Highlands in the early modern period to describe a portion of 
rent in kind.51 In some cases, what was deemed ‘custom’ became 
incorporated into the written obligations of tenants. An example is an 
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early-eighteenth-century contract, drawn up by the earl of Morton as 
Admiral-Depute, to take a share of whales driven ashore by tenant 
farmers in Shetland as part of his feudal rights to land and its 
products.52 Later landlords treated this innovation as a norm and 
paying a share of whales became a tenurial obligation. Custom here was 
a claim to historical continuity, which actually said more about 
historical change. Tenants knew that landlords could enforce such a 
usage not because of its longevity or reasonableness, but because they 
could evict those who refused to pay.53  
 
II  
CUSTOM IN PRACTICE 
The earl of Morton could do this quite easily because of his 
position as a Scottish landowner. There was a very limited market in 
small plots of rural land in Scotland except in certain areas or for a 
brief period in the sixteenth century when church lands were sold off 
or ‘feued’ (a feu was a perpetual lease, usually granted in exchange 
for a substantial cash sum and smaller subsequent annual payments).54 A 
few hundred individuals owned most of rural Scotland and in the 
seventeenth century ‘there were probably less than 5,000 men who 
possessed the right to inherit or sell the ground they held’.55 With 
landownership came an impressive array of rights that flowed ‘from the 
substantive law, not from a judicial remedy’.56 One concrete example is 
the law of hypothec, that gave the landowner first call on the produce 
of the land, even allowing him to reclaim corn sold by a tenant in the 
open market to repay a debt to him owing by said tenant.57 A Scottish 
owner or ‘heritor’ possessed an absolute right in the property of a 
certain tract of land and its produce, wherein the ability to exclude 
was central. At this, the pinnacle of ownership, rights in real 
property were far more ‘individualistic’, even absolute, than in 
England.58 A judgement of the Court of Session in 1744 stated bluntly 
what had long been plain: ‘It is the privilege of property that the 
proprietor can be put under no restraint.’59  
Land was worked by tenant farmers and their dependants. Leases 
in Scotland were usually called ‘tacks’ until the nineteenth century, 
a tack being ‘a contract of location, whereby the use of land, or any 
other immoveable subject, is set to the lessee or tacksman for a 
certain yearly rent’.60 Leases in England were considered ‘as a species 
of holding, but in Scotland are merely accounted a right of occupancy, 
and not of property’ where a leaseholder ‘purchases the temporary 
right in the produce, and usufruct, at a certain stipulated price’.61 
Unlike England, leases could not be perpetual in Scotland unless 
converted into a feu and a conventional lease to a person and his 
heirs could only last for the life of the grantee and his immediate 
successor; in practice, the longest agricultural lease was for 19 
years.62 The category of use rights created by owning and renting were 
strictly controlled by clearly enunciated charters of ownership and 
leases of possession. Furthermore, the general rule in Scots law 
followed post-classical Roman law: ‘writ cannot be taken away but by 
writ directly’.63 From the early seventeenth century, verbal tacks were 
only good against either party for less than one year and were not 
binding unless followed by a written contract.64 Even a formally 
defective written lease was more binding than a verbal one. 
The standing of written instruments and the rights of property 
enjoyed by heritors explains why early-modern Scottish lawyers had 
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little to say about custom as a way of securing rights of access to 
land. Judges struggled to know how to treat those who claimed 
customary tenure. These were called at the time ‘kindly tenants’ or 
‘rentallers’ (‘rentalled’ or enrolled in a rental book) and they held 
land by something like English copyhold of inheritance.65 They can be 
found scattered throughout the south-west, but were concentrated in 
certain areas such as St Mungo’s Rentall in Glasgow or Lochmaben in 
Dumfriesshire.66 When the church lands were being disposed of in 1563, 
the Scottish parliament and Privy Council (which functioned as a court 
prior to 1708) tried to protect the relatively small number of 
rentallers. Nevertheless their tenure was personal, based on residence 
and association, and could not be alienated without the landlord’s 
express permission. It was to good lordship that tenants appealed, not 
to customary law.67 For example, landlords might allow inheritance with 
a customary basis, but they did so because of a choice (what Hoyle 
calls for England ‘managerial practice’68) rather than because they 
were legally bound. Except in rare instances where obligation was 
upheld, a landlord gave voluntary concurrence to kindly rights and he 
could regulate what they were.69 As I. F. Grant suggested as long ago 
as 1930, ‘kindliness’ may have represented not ‘a definite category of 
holding’, but a ‘tendency’ to allow continuity of holding.70 In this 
sense ‘kyndlie tennentis’ could simply mean sitting tenants who could 
expect some favours as if really bound to a lord by kinship. In some 
of the documents their ‘kindness’ looks more like a species of good 
will in the property, comparable with Ulster tenant right of later 
centuries.71 
Recognising the uncertainty of ‘kindness’, Margaret Sanderson 
has nevertheless equated the custom of baronies with English manorial 
customs, arguing that Scottish landlords were bound by the customary 
law of their jurisdictions.72 There are, however, important 
distinctions both in law and practice. An English baron court was a 
private common-law court held by a lord as a royal franchise. There 
was no Scottish equivalent of the other side of manorial jurisdiction 
in England, the court leet or court customary, which was a royal court 
in private hands that concerned copyholders.73 Indeed, manors were 
never successfully introduced into Scotland and nor were civil 
parishes, probably because baronies performed many of the functions.74 
The closest approximation was a ‘birlay’ or ‘birlaw’ court, a body of 
Scandinavian origin which dealt with issues of ‘good neighbourhood’, 
including communal aspects of agriculture and debt.75 While it had 
(sometimes extensive) civil and criminal jurisdiction, a Scottish 
baron court was not a court of record.76 It was a lords’ court and its 
documents make almost no mention of custom (or any associated word or 
concept) except, as will become clear, at the level of agrarian 
practice. Tenants sometimes used the weight of common practice when 
asking for the owner’s indulgence. In documenting his reason for 
allowing some tenants or millers to write off crop losses occasioned 
by storms in 1732, the earl of Breadalbane saw ‘the Custom of the 
Countrey’ as what other local landowners did in comparable 
circumstances. The tenants invoked the birlaymen in this instance, but 
only to assess the extent of their loss – and they had to go through 
the earl’s chamberlain to summon the birlaymen to ‘comprise’ the 
extent. The earl then instructed his chamberlain to comply if he was 
able to substantiate this local practice. The tenants’ petition was 
for lordly lenience, not for a right.77  
Sometimes Scottish tenants had continuity of holding and their 
descendants were allowed to inherit, but without an analysis of court 
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cases where such rights were disputed it would be unwise to present 
the outcome of the process as the reason for it. As Sanderson notes, 
the word ‘kindly’ was used ‘to express belief in the rightness of 
possession by inheritance’.78 Cases before the Court of Session that 
involved kindly tenants are among the few where appeal to the custom 
of a barony was entertained, but claims had to be proven per scripta 
vel iuramentum.79 Some kindly tenants had written claims that might 
ultimately have rested on an assertion of kinship, but any enforceable 
title lay more in that proximate written instrument than the more 
distant customary source of their claim.80  
Unlike English common law, Scots law after the main period of 
Roman reception hardly recognised oral tradition and thus offered no 
protection to customary tenure which had this as its basis. Late-
sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century century judges brought some 
kindly tenants into the body of landowners because they had written 
title and because it was legally tidy, not because they appealed to 
custom or because the courts (as Parliament had done for a time) tried 
to favour a particular social group; in other instances, but for the 
same reason, that their rights were vague, they treated them as simply 
another type of tenant-at-will.81 Similarly, those tenants who took 
their lords to court disputed the letter of agreements, not some 
putative spirit.82 Custom was not usually supported at law on the basis 
of verbal agreement (which could only be provable in certain limited 
circumstances) and a written lease removed any dispute from the realm 
of custom to that of contract. The process of defining Scottish land 
rights in the late sixteenth century is best understood not as an 
attack on custom, but as a belated tying up of loose ends by testing 
it before a central court in contentious cases. This fixed the rights 
of owners rather than users of land at a time of political, social and 
economic change.83  
What sets English custom apart is what the courts used it for, 
admitting oral testimony not only to establish matters of fact (where 
it still holds a central place in civil and criminal courts) but also 
to establish matters of law.84 For example, a medieval manorial court 
could articulate law, allowing a controversy to create a rule, because 
custom had to be proved before a jury where common law had to be 
determined by judges. Communal practice could therefore be a source of 
law in England.85 The question of what the law is, at the level of the 
English copyhold tenant, is (unlike the common law) a matter of proof. 
Copyhold could not be pleaded at English common law (which only 
recognised freehold) but it could before manor courts or at the Court 
of Requests with appeal to the crown in Chancery as the protector of 
custom.86 Common law courts could hear problems surrounding customs 
(mainly reasonableness and proof) and it was here from the mid-
sixteenth century that issues about copyhold tenures were played out; 
cases of local custom decided by central courts could become common 
law without necessarily changing local customs.87 The 1620s and 1630s 
were particularly important for defining traditional ‘customary’ 
rights in England, while it is generally (if vaguely) assumed that 
during the following two centuries the ‘clarification’ of property 
rights in England led to the de-legitimation of customary use rights, 
which in some cases (like gleaning) became redefined as theft.88 Rights 
of property came to dominate rights of use or possession.89 
In contrast, social change in Scotland occurred within a more 
tightly structured framework of law and tenure. As Grant put it, ‘open 
field’ in Scotland was an arrangement between tenants and lord - ‘a 
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matter of preference among the individual cultivators’ – and enclosure 
by agreement or directive was simpler after 1695.90 ‘Common land’, as 
it is known in England, did not exist in Scotland and to have any 
rights to ‘commonty’ (land possessed in common by different 
proprietors) a claimant needed documentary evidence because ‘no amount 
of common usage constituted any legal right’.91 The commonties of the 
most important towns, the royal burghs, were excluded from this 
legislation because they could not be divided; magistrates could hold 
land for the burgh (they were ‘infeft’ in it) and could claim use 
rights called ‘servitudes’ or burdens on the absolute rights of 
owners.92 To do this they required written evidence of commonty or 
other rights, even if the extent of these could then be established 
before the Court of Session by oral evidence of prolonged usage.93 This 
meant that the precise nature of use rights in certain types of town 
(not all burghs were royal burghs) could be established by custom, but 
not the legal right itself. One implication is the absence of any 
possibility of establishing customary recreational (or other) rights 
on land in Scotland (including in burghs) without a pre-existing 
written instrument allowing the possibility of said rights.94  
Paradoxically, the extension of something like English custom to 
land use in Scotland came not in the medieval or early modern period, 
but in the mid-nineteenth century, when the Court of Session gave a 
measure of protection over land use to urban inhabitants against the 
corruption of their own burgh magistrates.95 Indeed, custom had long 
possessed more substance in towns than in the countryside. Early 
burghs had customary laws to promote and regulate trade and 
production.96 For example in April 1547 Stirling burgh court supported 
the actions of the fleshers’ incorporation (butchers’ guild) in 
confiscating a chopping knife from a non-burgess on the grounds that 
it ‘findis use and consuetude of craftis to tak unfremennis werklumes 
[confiscate unfreemen’s tools]’.97 Applied thus, custom was still 
recognised in the nineteenth century and indeed ‘custom of trade’ or 
commercial customs are presently regarded as the only relevant 
customary source of modern Scots law.98 
The stark clarity of rights of property in Scotland had 
extensive ramifications for institutional arrangements, social 
relations and the standard of living. For example, the fudging of 
parish use rights and manorial property rights, which allowed the 
Elizabethan poor laws to work in England until the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth-century, had no equivalent in Scotland.99 There was no 
waste or common on which the poor could settle without the explicit 
sanction of the lord or his legal tenant, who needed permission to 
sub-let. It was unthinkable in Scotland that even crown commissioners 
could allow encroachments upon wastes and common to be counted as 
personal property, as they might do in England and Wales for those 
with long occupancy.100 Nor was gleaning ever a right in Scotland: 
heritors simply tolerated it for some inhabitants in the interests of 
poor relief and increasingly strict Scottish landowners can be found 
removing access to gleaning, grazing, timber or other resources in the 
second half of the eighteenth century.101 Rights of property affected 
rights of use, which were much more obviously discretionary in 
Scotland.102 In rural parishes landowners controlled both the formal 
resources of poor relief (mostly church collections and endowments, 
for rates were usually only imposed in emergencies before the 
eighteenth century) and many of the informal supports of concession. 
This helps to explain the strong attachment to even a small foothold 
in the land shown by Scots and similarly remarked upon by observers of 
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Irish life in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.103 With a 
holding of land subsistence was possible; without one it was at best 
precarious and this relationship held true even for those with 
industrial employments and for the minor professions like 
schoolteachers. 
From Elizabethan times the English and Welsh had settlement and 
poor laws with clear entitlements. Landlords who tried wholesale 
eviction there could be obliged to resettle those who had been moved; 
people who went to another parish could be shipped back to where they 
had settlement or that parish could offer (at discretion) non-resident 
relief; JPs acted as enforcers of the rights of the poor.104 In 
contrast, Scottish lords were effectively answerable to no higher 
authority and they could remove people without worrying about the 
implications of their actions, which became someone else’s problem – 
notably the major towns in the early and mid-nineteenth century. 
Withholding poor relief could even be a tactic to compel migration 
from an estate.105 Enforcing entitlements could be difficult, making 
voluntary and involuntary migration a fact of life for Scots and, as 
in many poor areas of Europe, both emigration and seasonal movements 
of population were enduringly common. A Scottish lord’s moral 
obligation to relieve his poor was a strong one that could be imposed 
upon within a well-understood hierarchy of resort, but it was largely 
unenforceable outside the ‘court’ of the lord’s conscience or public 
opinion. This helps to explain why the tensions created by the 
transition to capitalist landlordism were usually localised in 
Scotland and never became a national political issue prior to the 
1840s.  
 
III  
CUSTOM AND AGRARIAN CHANGE IN HIGHLAND SCOTLAND 
It is conventional to assume that custom mattered more in the 
distant past and in more economically backward areas. The usual 
picture is that the right to land became more fixed, certain and 
‘individual’ as land itself became a mere chattel or commodity, 
eclipsing ideas of custom and community while entailing a loss of 
rights for the peasantry - something which happened most rapidly in 
the more economically advanced areas.106 Thus John Stuart Mill thought 
that: ‘The farther we look back in history, the more we see all 
transactions and engagements under the influence of fixed customs.’107 
Understanding property rights in historic Scotland helps us to 
question these assumptions, for we shall see shortly that moving 
backward in time does not necessarily reveal greater importance for 
custom. Nor did it matter more in so-called ‘backward’ regions during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed continuity in early-
modern Highland landholding was no more extensive than in the Lowlands 
and most tenants held at will. Claims to ‘kindness’ were applied to 
the clan élite of ‘tacksmen’ (a sort of minor gentry - usually cadets 
with written leases), not to simple clansmen who were their sub-
tenants. There was indeed very little stability at a township or 
‘toun’ level, even in the seventeenth century, though farmers tried to 
stay on the estate if moved from a holding.108 The turnover of Highland 
tenants during the early modern period was such as to prevent 
occupancy becoming so sustained as to be the basis for ‘customary’ 
possession, in the sense of persisting for a long time. When 
incidental information reveals the reasons why holdings or tenancies 
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were asked for by and granted to particular individuals, the papers 
talk of favours and loyalties, but never of rights. Not surprisingly 
then, Samuel Johnson described tenants in the Western Isles as ‘mere 
beings of an hour’ and one landholder described himself as ‘an instant 
tenant’.109 For a late-Victorian audience informed by English 
expectations of custom and continuity, the Duke of Argyll patiently 
explained about crofts on Tiree in the early nineteenth century: ‘so 
far from the possessions held by the tenants having belonged to 
themselves or their “ancestors”, these possessions were either given 
to them by the special favour of the proprietor at a very recent 
period, or were still later acquired by irregular subdivisions against 
the rules and regulations of the estate’.110 
The plain voice of a man with absolute rights in land, the 
Duke’s remarks also alluded to the strongly felt but legally amorphous 
Highland concept of duthchas (‘heritage’) where tacksmen linked to 
their lord (notionally at least) by kinship expected a customary right 
to the hereditary possession of their land. This right was ill-defined 
and, because it was based on an appeal to fictive kinship and emotion, 
was ‘antithetical to being prescribed or redacted’.111 It tended to be 
a vague claim to right of access to land on an estate, not an 
entitlement to a particular holding. In fact Highland tenants had 
virtually no concrete rights at all under the traditional system, 
apart from those accorded voluntarily by chiefs for their own reasons, 
which were the social status conferred by having large numbers of 
adherents who could engage in feasting and fighting. Highland society 
was based on a system of redistributive exchange involving gifting and 
the circulation of assets (principally livestock and land) between 
lord and man. Ideals and practices of mutual obligation were far more 
important to social and economic relationships than was any fixed 
allocation of entitlement to economic assets. Gifts had to be kept in 
motion, for it was the giving and receiving that created and enhanced 
‘value’ (particularly senses of community, service and obligation) 
rather than static accumulation of wealth in a capitalist sense.112 
Moving tenants between holdings was one circulating asset. 
As with Lowlanders, it was not that Highland tenants and sub-
tenants had had rights which were eroded or overturned: they had never 
had any strong claim based on custom or kindness that could be 
enforced outside their everyday relations with landowners. As Hobsbawm 
noticed, Scottish peasants may have had communal rights, but they 
could not convert them into property rights.113 Indeed, it was the 
fundamental lack of legally enforceable rights that facilitated 
agrarian ‘improvement’ and the drastic social changes that took place 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Highlands – and also the 
equally extensive, but much less well-known, dispossession of groups 
such as ‘cottars’ (cottagers and labourers) in the Lowlands. For the 
Highlands, Allan Macinnes calls this ‘the triumph of the legalist over 
the traditionalist concept of heritage’: of oighreachd (heritable 
title) over duthchas (heritable proprietorship).114 While it should not 
be reified, there is no denying the emotional or moral power of 
duthchas to those who accepted it and its appeal underlay riots and 
‘land raids’ in the nineteenth- and even twentieth-century Highlands 
and Islands.115 The rights it conferred seem almost tangible, even if 
they had no legal force and some Highland tenants actually refused to 
accept written leases, which they felt would undermine their claim on 
the favour of their chief.  
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Orality and memory were central to Highland society and culture, 
but their value in buttressing customary claims to land was solely 
determined by the attitude of its owners. When landowners ceased to be 
chiefs and began to see their status as dependent on getting and 
spending money outside their estate – when they became mere landlords, 
concerned with cutting a figure in Edinburgh or London – their good 
will evaporated.116 Thus the earl of Breadalbane was happy to allow 
‘the custom of the place’ to influence who took over a tenancy - ‘it 
is customary on this estate to give the possession to the son who is 
oldest and continues longest on it assisting his parents’ - but that 
qualified right was itself contingent on his being able to stock and 
run the farm profitably.117 More, when in 1793 the earl became 
determined to provide troops to defend Britain, he was prepared to 
favour either someone who had had a son volunteer for service in his 
‘Fencibles’ (militia) or a son who had served over one who stayed 
behind, regardless of other previously stated criteria.118  
 
IV 
CUSTOM, LAW AND CONTEXT IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND OVER THE LONGUE DURÉE 
The early modern Highlands were socially quite different from 
the Lowlands, but Scottish tenurial relationships as a whole display 
an enduring imbalance between lord and peasant from at least the 
twelfth century. Maitland mused to his Scottish correspondent, Sheriff 
George Neilson, about tenure in Britain. ‘How did you escape copyhold 
or something analogous thereto: for a base tenure protected only in a 
lord’s court is no merely English phenomenon but is found in France 
and in Germany.’119 Copyhold had attractions for lords and tenants 
alike, yet Scottish lords largely shunned it.120 Maitland immediately 
dismissed the usual explanation ‘that the disappearance of custom 
before contract[,] the resolution of labour services into a mere “cash 
nexus”[,] is a sign of growing wealth’, because Scotland was poor; he 
did not mention it, but labour services survived into the eighteenth 
century. Nor could it be the greater strength of the king’s courts 
compared with England. ‘There is here something that I can not 
understand … The answer must be so important not merely in your legal 
but in your economic history.’121 
In England and Ireland after the Norman and Anglo-Norman 
conquests, existing institutions, communities and owners of resources 
fought hard to protect their rights and property against what were 
termed ‘new customs’ or ‘bad customs’, meaning that many types of 
claim were written down.122 These charters of customs (‘customaries’ or 
‘custumals’) were frequently ‘the lordly regulation of lordly 
privilege’, but the formalization of custom also benefited tenants by 
fixing rights and exactions.123 An example is what is known to 
historians of inheritance as gavelkind or ‘the custom of Kent’ – 
though that was only slowly committed to writing.124 At the same time 
local courts were allowed to persist and to prosper. ‘English manorial 
courts at the critical time – in the thirteenth century – were left 
with an immense amount of important and useful work to do, under 
procedures that unlearned men could well understand. They were not 
meddled with and bewildered by the central government or by great 
feudal lords’.125  
The rights of the English copyholder rested on a custom of the 
manor whose content depended on local knowledge, subject to being 
proved by oral evidence in court, even if it was later supported by 
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written entries in court rolls.126 Until the reign of Henry II and ‘the 
rise of the common law’, lords had discretion about whom to admit as 
tenants, so that tenure was legally precarious, even if there were 
customary expectations to succeed on certain terms. Freeholders 
benefited from ‘the rise of the common law’, but insecurity still 
affected those who held unfree villein tenures, which became 
copyhold.127 There was no supervisory jurisdiction of the king’s courts 
here, at least until Chancery and then the common law began to 
intervene in the early modern period. The workings of the later 
medieval curia regis did impact on lordly courts, giving more positive 
rights to well-established customary claims – albeit over fewer 
tenants as time went on.128 For Milsom: ‘The customs started to become 
laws with an existence independent of the lord and his court when the 
king’s courts began to intervene regularly in their affairs.’129  
Of course, a good lord (what Maitland called a ‘decent lord’130) 
consulted those beneath him, judiciously giving and taking, renouncing 
and claiming. Lords were required to understand the operation of 
reciprocal obligation; good ones acted with circumspection and 
discretion, taking into account broader circumstances that included 
formal advice from a manor court or informal submissions by dependants 
when making ‘managerial’ decisions.131 Yet even once the king’s courts 
intervened, the content of the law – for example, the rules of 
inheritance – did not become a matter of common law (as they did with 
freehold) but remained a matter of local law, which had to be proved. 
The worlds of freehold and copyhold were very different because the 
unfree were excluded from the king’s courts. Presumably, had the 
decision been taken to give access for all tenants to the king’s 
courts from the start, the same common law rules would have been 
applied to all, and local variations would have been forgotten about.  
For English villeins, custom attenuated the disadvantages of 
being unfree at the same time as it acted to enforce obligations to 
the lord. The ability of tenants to claim customary rights and to have 
some say in what those rights were and had been, was a direct 
manifestation of their place in, or their ability to influence, the 
existing hierarchy of power. In the broad sweep of English history 
custom had always been valuable to tenants, holding down rents when 
land was scarce in the late thirteenth century, for example.132 
Demographic forces after the Black Death also worked to the advantage 
of the late medieval English peasantry - even if the Statute of 
Labourers and the fate of the Peasants’ Revolt showed where the 
greater power lay.133 Over time, economic and demographic change and 
the continuously modified procedures of the king’s courts for 
enforcing custom produced an effect strongly beneficial to peasants 
touched by it. By the time of Sir Henry Spelman (c.1600) the net 
effect of interventions by the king’s courts was to move ‘the 
propriety of the soil from the Lord unto the Tenant’, markedly so for 
customary tenants in the north of England.134  
The contrast for Geoffrey Barrow is stark. ‘In Scotland it is 
hard to avoid the impression that the slate was wiped clean c.1100 and 
a fresh start was made.’135 Surviving documents from medieval Scotland 
‘were designed to guarantee the future security of newly-founded 
institutions and newly-arrived individuals and families’.136 Subsequent 
legal receptions were tailored to suit the interests of post-1100 
owners, not only the widely cited adoption of English law in the 
twelfth cntury, but the apparently more extensive later Roman 
reception.137 Even if Scots law was influenced by British (in its 
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proper ancient meaning), Norse and Irish traditions, later attempts to 
codify ‘old laws’ ran into the problem that there was little that was 
authentically old and what there was had become reduced to 
talismans.138 Referring to the fifteenth-century introduction of Roman 
law in Scotland (and Germany), Russian émigré Paul Vinogradoff, wrote: 
‘the law of the learned thrust national customs into the background 
for a long time’.139 Fascinated by what he saw as the organic or 
‘autonomous’ substructure that governed many local activities, he went 
so far as to claim that there were ‘points in ancient law obviously 
connected with social usages which do not lose their significance even 
when they have been determined and formulated by legislative or 
judicial interpretation’, including agrarian customs and business 
practice.140 In a society without much writing, oral forms and 
customary practices must indeed have been more important than they 
would later become. Medieval canon law, in which conscience played an 
important role, allowed more presence for custom based on usages and 
proven by oral testimony; many kindly tenants held from the Church.141 
Yet there is little sign that custom had been any stronger as an 
accessible use-right in the Middle Ages simply because orality was 
more important: its significance as a resource was already limited 
before the main Roman reception of the fifteenth century.  
Nor did Scotland have the equivalent of English royal justices, 
who travelled on circuit to hear a wide range of pleas including 
criminal cases and who had extensive supervisory functions. Scottish 
criminal justice was highly devolved and the state lacked a centrally 
supervised criminal court system until the late seventeenth century. 
The expansion of royal power through civil jurisdiction may have been 
to the advantage of some Scottish tenants as central government 
justified moves against distinctive law codes in the south-west and in 
the Western Isles as a way of defending tenants from oppressive 
lordship by, for example, the taking of ‘calps’ or ‘cawps’ as an 
exaction in exchange for maintenance and protection.142 The social 
conservatism of government policy on the feuing of church lands in the 
sixteenth century was part of the same ethos. Securing peasant rights 
through the spread of royal justice was, however, much less prominent 
in late-medieval Scotland than in England and, when put to it, 
parliament only protected tenants against abuses of lordship rather 
than lordly exploitation itself.143  
Those to whom the rights of public justice were deputed in 
Scotland retained the privilege of delegating powers that had been 
lost by English barons in the twelfth century. Until the seventeenth 
century the most exalted also had extensive judicial powers, including 
the right to ‘repledge’ or take certain cases away from a court where 
they had been initiated (including royal courts) if the accused 
normally resided in their jurisdiction.144 The extensive network of 
franchisal or non-royal secular courts in Scotland may have enforced 
the king’s law, but they dispensed the lord’s justice. Scottish 
bondsmen were never able to defend hereditary title to land at the 
lord’s court in the way English villeins became able to do, leaving 
Scots more in the legal power of their lords.145 Keith Stringer has 
shown how much latitude the Scottish lord had in choosing his tenants, 
unhindered by either royal courts or hereditary claims.146 Examples of 
Scottish ‘brieves of naifty’ after the mid-twelfth century, about 
fugitives from lordship, did not concern the fugitive himself. 
Instead, they ‘retain a far more seignorial flavour than English 
writs. Essentially they remain royal confirmations of seignorial 
rights, warnings to rival lords; clauses ordering the return of 
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fugitives were still inserted in general charters of confirmation and 
brieves of protection, long after such practices had ceased in 
England.’147 ‘Enchartering’ the countryside in the thirteenth century 
further served to maintain tenurial lordship and establish clear 
rights over the persons of subordinates.148 
Because of how ‘social-property systems’ were configured, 
subsequent demographic and economic change had less beneficial effect 
on Scotland’s peasantry. Little is known about the effects of the 
Black Death, but comparable improvements in their status do not seem 
to have occurred in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth 
centuries. The only advantages were the disappearance of serfdom, 
continuity in leases when ownership changed, and, possibly, the 
introduction of ‘kindly’ tenures.149 And there is tantalising evidence 
that, where later leases were bilateral (though strongly favouring the 
landowner), the few that survive from the late Middle Ages were 
unilateral assignations or ‘assedations’ of rights of occupancy 
without mutual obligement on the lessee’s part.150 Against this, 
servile dues as incidents of tenure persisted and leases remained 
short.151 There may have been demographic reasons why the Scottish 
peasantry did not experience the cycles of advantage and disadvantage 
of their English counterparts. While England went through phases of 
being over- and under-peopled, Scotland may always have been more-or-
less over-populated relative to resources, as suggested by 
persistently high levels of emigration from the thirteenth to the 
twentieth century. Yet more absolute rights of real property allowed 
Scottish owners to remain in control through economic and demographic 
cycles.152 
Changes in the form and terms of Scottish leases in later 
centuries reflect the same imbalance in power. The number of surviving 
written leases to land rose rapidly from the 1620s at a time when the 
pressure of rising population and prices was still strong.153 
Landowners had to be more aware of estate management and record-
keeping: many were in debt, some to urban merchants and others to 
their own tenants, who may have seized the chance to bargain for 
greater security.154 We may be uncertain about the precise reasons why 
written leases were introduced, but a clue is given by the interests 
they protected. Written leases in theory secured the rights of both 
parties, requiring due process in their implementation. However, even 
when appealing to ‘custom and repute’ and when including bilateral 
obligements, early-modern leases spend far more time outlining the 
obligations of tenants to proprietors than vice versa and detailing 
what tenants could not do - notably cutting growing trees or hunting 
game - rather than what their privileges were. The reluctant 
Highlanders mentioned above may have recognised this. Written leases 
reduced ambiguity, but they also diminished opportunities to invoke 
‘use and wont’ and they fixed the dependence of users upon owners of 
land. 
While written leases gradually became accepted, the terms of the 
contract between landlord and tenant could alter over time. In periods 
of buoyant demand for land landlords preferred short leases with 
payments in kind, though they were not always able to benefit from 
price rises.155 Economic conditions changed markedly in the period 
c.1650-1750 and landlords sought to fix tenancies (and rents) for up 
to 19 years. Longer leases were not necessarily a sign of 
‘improvement’, but a way for landowners to shift the burden of risk to 
tenants.156 During this period leases increasingly specified rental 
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payments in cash rather than in kind. Sometimes presented as an 
indicator of the late monetarisation of Scotland’s economy, this was 
just another way of protecting landlord incomes when arable prices 
were falling.157 Other ‘public burdens’ (taxes), which notionally fell 
on heritors, were sloughed off onto tenants (and sub-tenants), who 
were in practice responsible for levies as varied as the land tax and 
the schoolmaster’s salary.158 A prolonged period when market conditions 
might seem to favour tenants was in fact marked by a pronounced 
souring of relations between lord and tenant. 
The economic upswing of the second half of the eighteenth 
century was similarly orchestrated to the benefit of owners. What are 
known as ‘improving’ leases in the later eighteenth century were so 
called because they contained legally enforceable clauses designed to 
make tenants carry out improvements to the land such as rotating 
crops, draining bogs and liming acid soil.159 Such ‘covenants’ overrode 
any existing ‘use and wont’ and the improvement was paid for by the 
tenant with the aim of benefiting the landowner by raising both rents 
and the capital value of the property. Indicative of the imbalance of 
power behind tenurial relationships, these leases remained at 19 years 
or less. Along with ‘improving’ leases went simpler procedures, 
introduced in 1756 to facilitate the removal of tenants who had failed 
to pay their rents.160 Scottish owners could insert and implement 
covenants far more easily than landlords elsewhere in Britain and 
Ireland. Possessing land in Scotland and Ulster, the earl of Abercorn 
expressed his bitter exasperation at his inability to change the 
farming practices of his Irish tenants as he could his Scottish. ‘I 
think it an act of lunacy to enter into covenants for a long term 
which I am bound and intend to perform, with people who profess not to 
think themselves bound on their parts. The only justification of 
letting leases even for seven years is that the shortness of the term 
may make the tenants reflect they cannot break their covenants with 
impunity’.161 A generation earlier in Berkshire Sir Mark Pleydell 
recognised that only the simplest agreements about farming would work 
with his copyholders, ‘because all other matters are directed and 
overruled by the Custom’.162 
 
V 
CUSTOM AS A ‘RESOURCE’ IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN BRITAIN 
The historical development of social and tenurial relationships 
and of custom as a currency in mediating them was very different in 
England from Scotland. Richard Hoyle writes of England: ‘Custom was 
the possession of the tenants, for custom, by its very nature, was a 
mode of behaviour which worked to their advantage: but it was also the 
practice of the lords.’163 Custom was useful to the English peasantry 
because it was useful to their lords. As in Sweden, a heterogeneous 
and divided nobility had an interest in supporting custom in the 
Middle Ages as a way of buttressing their own claims to land.164 
English common law was originally general customary law: the customs 
of the king’s courts ‘common’ to all, decided by judges.165 The central 
ethos of the dominant element of the legal system was the idea of 
practice becoming standardized over time. Custom could only derogate 
from the common law where it was long-established and fixed, and 
common law could not be abrogated by new custom.166 To question custom 
in an individual case involving a copyholder (no matter how 
insignificant) might risk undermining this central principle. In the 
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Middle Ages English lords may have come increasingly to rely on 
written records, but they had frequently to resort to the memory of 
tenants to confirm the obligations of the peasantry (on issues like 
rents and entry fines) as well as their rights (such as inheritance or 
widows’ free bench).167 In England mutual utility gave custom presence 
and continuity, ‘substance and equivalence’. As barrister Samuel 
Carter put it in 1696, ‘the Custom of the Manor is the life and soul 
of Copy-hold Estates; for without a Custom, or if they break their 
Custom, they are subject to the Will of the Lord’.168 
The idea that customary rights constrained lords and kings had a 
profound constitutional dimension for the English and was at the heart 
of documents like Magna Carta, the Petition of Right and the Bill of 
Rights.169 This appeal to custom, based on the notion that law can be 
communally created from ideas of what is ‘just’ or ‘right’, which lay 
beyond the ability of lords and government to overturn, emboldened the 
peasantry of medieval England (both free and villein) and was 
frequently invoked during resistance and revolt.170  Custom also 
remained part of the English élite’s political thought, the gentry 
appealing to it in the late seventeenth century when trying to assert 
disputed rights.171 The middling sort increasingly appropriated the 
language and vocabulary of custom to serve their interests, but it 
also helped to politicize members of the lower orders, where 
‘politics’ is broadly defined as the struggle for and use of power, 
wherever pursued.172 Thus Andy Wood can write: ‘For many generations, 
writing and speech acted together to define remembrance and custom, 
and to strengthen local identities.’173 In this sense it was the 
proffered ideal of custom as guarantor of liberties that was as 
important as its concrete value. English society had a collective 
memory embedded in custom, which gave it a strong sense of its own 
identity. Particular custom belonged to specific people in specific 
localities (if it was general it would be the common law174) but 
because it was a multiple-use right accessible to all levels of 
society it could be a tool against capitalism and class 
exploitation.175  
Custom’s place in Scottish society was less exalted, but closer 
to Thompson’s interest in what prevailed where the reach of written 
authority gave way: those areas of practice or exploitation not 
covered or specified in leases or court bylaws.176 Historians’ 
dependence on what is written, the paper residue, should not deceive 
us into thinking that what is merely ‘custom’ has only a limited role. 
Scottish farming communities were full of ‘usages’ – or of ‘social 
habits’, ‘popular habits’ and mores (in Vinogradoff’s terms177) or the 
‘everyday’ (to use Henri Lefebvre’s178) - the practices and routines 
not covered by tacks or court enactments. These were managed through 
bottom-up forms of convention, only revealed in disputes over 
resources involving witnesses talking from memory about what prevailed 
as ‘common practice’ or ‘use and wont’.179 The working of local birlaw 
courts, that regulated agriculture and neighbourhood, is largely 
undocumented, but probably operated more or less according to what was 
customary. The gross amount paid would be specified in rentals and 
written agreements, but unwritten ‘custom of the place’ or ‘use and 
wont’ provided a gloss, an elaboration on what had been written down. 
When considering how farm towns operated, and the limited amount 
actually specified in sixteenth- or early-seventeenth-century tacks or 
court acts, one can see how forms of custom or claims to ‘use and 
wont’ would have continued to order everyday practice. These usages 
mattered most at the lowest social levels, for the majority of the 
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population on unimproved estates were sub-tenants: all they had (or 
could ever have) was a verbal agreement founded on notions of ‘use and 
wont’ or an idea of ‘normal’ day’s work and wages for labourers.180  
It is only at this low, but still meaningful, level that custom 
had currency in early modern Scotland. Only here, as Thompson put it, 
was custom ‘the interface between law and agrarian practice’ or a 
‘property’. Yet even here, as he said, it was more an ‘ambience’ than 
a ‘fact’, existing ‘within a context of … norms and tolerances’.181 
This more lowly and limited place explains why custom’s role as a 
politicizing force was reduced compared with England, the spaces 
within which the lower orders negotiated their subordination being 
more circumscribed. The word features little in eighteenth-century 
protests and Scottish strikers who went to court about working hours 
and wages appealed to equity rather than custom in support of their 
claims.182 For their part Scottish élites sometimes attacked aspects of 
customary practice (like industrial workers taking Monday as a 
holiday), but there was no need to take on custom because it did not 
matter to groups with rights and privileges secured by writing and 
buttressed by a fundamental imbalance in power. This explains why, in 
Hobsbawm’s words, ‘la solution légale du problème agraire se révéla 
exclusivement favorable aux propriétaires fonciers et aux 
capitalistes, et exclusivement défavorable à la paysannerie’.183 In 
contrast with England or Sweden (or Ulster184) Scotland’s landed élite 
was cohesive and powerful, pushing forward its own interests with 
little constraint and little overt agrarian protest.185 Scottish 
landowners were the most absolute in Britain, dominating local 
government and many aspects of local and national society and politics 
deep into the nineteenth century.186  
In his work on inheritance and elsewhere, Thompson told us that 
one essential grid for comparing societies is who ‘owns’ a resource, 
be it economic or cultural.187 Custom’s value as a resource in England 
depended primarily on being shared by many levels of society rather 
than owned by one. Martin Dowling reminds us: ‘When custom had an 
immediate meaning in a stable context, there was no process of 
definition.’188 It was that dynamic process which gave custom its 
importance in English society, for history is not just a state of 
being and ‘[s]tructures cannot be understood without the events and 
processes which produced them’.189 In Scotland the meaning was more 
precise and restricted, the opportunity for interpretation, 
disagreement, manipulation and negotiation pressed down deep into the 
‘everyday’. In Thompson’s terms custom was not ‘of the people’ when it 
came to ‘social-property systems’ in early modern Scotland – it was 
not really ‘of’ anyone except perhaps the owners of land. But what 
really matters to social, economic and cultural life is not who 
‘owned’ custom, but how valuable a resource it could be in a given 
domain. As Thompson also reminded us, ‘the discipline of history is, 
above all, the discipline of context’.190  
There may be lessons for historians of all three kingdoms from 
understanding custom in comparative context. Wales has not been 
considered for reasons of space, but one intriguing possibility is 
that it was a sort of half-way-house between Scotland and England when 
it came to the force of custom. Subject to both indigenous influences 
and English law following ‘private enterprise’ invasions by Anglo-
Norman magnates from the twelfth century, marcher lords whose power 
covered much of Wales established a distinctive system of march law. 
Native and Anglo-Norman laws were separate (as they were in Ireland) 
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and Wales only became fully integrated into English common law systems 
after 1536. Local custom never developed any equivalent strength to 
that found in England: for example, gavelkind or cyfran was superseded 
by primogeniture for legal succession to land in Wales in 1543.191 The 
lesson for historians of Scotland is that the context in which custom 
was important was very different from England. The challenge is to 
explore how relations between lords and peasants (and among ‘the puir 
pepil that labouris the grunde’) operated and how usages could 
influence the negotiation of dependence at the level of the 
‘everyday’. One might finally (and gently) suggest that the lesson for 
historians of England is a broader one lying in Maitland’s modest 
admission to Neilson in 1901: ‘I was oppressed by my ignorance of 
Scotland.’192 
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